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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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INTERNATIONAL BROTHER-
HOOD OF POLICE OFFICERS, 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
vs. 
BOARD OF CITY COMMISSIONERS 
OF SALT LAKE CITY CORPORA-
TION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 14842 
BRIEF OF THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
Appeal from a judgment of the Third District Cbnit:-f 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah1 Bc;>no* ·~ · 
J. E. Banks, Judge, presiding. ·, . ·: J: . 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
321 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellants 
. '):;,_"\" 
Attorney for 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID WESTLY AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHER-
HOOD OF POLICE OFFICERS, 
Plaintiff-Appellants, Case No. 14842 
vs. 
BOARD OF CITY COMMISSIONERS 
OF SALT LAKE CITY CORPORA-
TION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action whereunder the plaintiff-appellants 
sought a declaratory judgment seeking the lower court to: 
(a) Rule that a 1976 5% wage increase was illegal, 
when the City payed that raise and accepted waivers, 
only under procedures outlined by the City Commission; 
(b) Rule that a City Commission action, which 
barred union activities on City time, was illegal; and 
(c) Declare that the Statement of Purpose found 
in Section 34-19-1 Utah Code Ann. created substantive 
rights of collective bargaining in Utah public sector 
employees. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court, J.E. Banks granted the 
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defendant-respondent's motion to dismiss, with · preJudice, 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-respondent seeks to have the lower court': 
dismissal affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-appellants' complaint alleges as the legal 
basis for relief, that the preamble to Utah's little Norris 
LaGuardia Act created substantive legal rights of collective 
bargaining in Utah public sector employees. Premised 00 
that legal theory, plaintiff-appellants assert: 
1. Salt Lake City, as a Utah municipal corporation, 
failed to bargain in good faith when it: 
(a) Exercised its legislative power, adopted i~ 
budget, set salaries for its 1976 fiscal year, and 
permitted protesting employees to waive their salary 
increase only in a procedure outlined by the Commission. 
Count I and III, R-2; R-6; and 
(b) Passed a directive that City union activities 
would be done on other than the public's time. Count i: 
R-5. 
2. The police union and its president are entitled 
to a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. count rv, 
R-7. 
-2-
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POINT I 
SECTION 34-19-1, ET SEQ., UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953 DOES NOT ESTABLISH OR CREATE SUBSTAciT'IVE 
RIGHTS UPON WHICH THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS MAY 
BASE A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
A. 
A STATEMENT OF INTENT OR PREAMBLE TO LEGISLATION 
DOES NOT CREATE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS. 
The legal foundation of plaintiff-appellants' complaint 
is the allegation that the preamble to the so called "Little 
Norris-LaGuardia Act" of this State created a substantive 
obligation upon the State of Utah and its political sub-
division to collectively bargain with public employees. 
The relevant portions of this preamble provides as follows: 
"Declaration of Policy -- In the interpreta-
tion and application of this chapter, the 
public policy of this state is declared as 
follows: 
* * * 
"(3) it is necessary that the individual 
employee have full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives 
of his own choosing to negotiate the terms 
and conditions of his employment and that he 
shall be free from the interference, restraint 
or coersion of employers of labor, or their 
agents, in the designation of such representa-
tives or in self-organization or in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collect~ve 
bargaininq or their (sic) mutual aid or protection." 
34-19-1 Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended (Emphasis 
added). 
Preamble provisions such as the foregoing, have uniformly 
been held to be a legislative statement of intent and 
used in the construction of later substantive provisions. 
They do not create or enlarge the scope of a statute. 
-3-
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This point is succinctly stated by Su th~ on 
Statutory Construction; this treatise states: 
"The function of the preamble is to supply 
reasons and explanations and not to confer power 
or determine rights. [Citations omitted) Hence 
it cannot be given the effect of enlarging the--
scope or effect of a statute. [Citations omitted)" 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, id. at §47.06, 
p. 81 (Emphasis added) . 
Even the State of Washington's decisions (upon which 
the plaintiff-appellants' placed virtual sole reliance under 
the case of Krys tad v. Lau) upheld this principle and dis-
tinguished the Krys tad case cited by appellants. It correcti: 
noted: 
"Both in England and in this country it 
was at one time a common practice to prefix to 
each law a preface or preamble stating the 
motives and inducement to the making of it; 
but it is not an essential part of the statute 
and is now generally omitt~d. It is not only 
not essential and generally omitted, but it is 
without force in a legislative sense, being 
but a guide to the intentions of the framer. 
As such guide it is often of importance. In 
this sense it is said to be a key to open the 
understanding of a statute. The preamble is 
properly referred to when doubts or ambiguities 
arise upon the words of the enacting part. It 
can never enlarge. It is no part of the la~. 
Sedgwick, Construction of Statutory & Constitu~ 
tional Law (2d ed.), pp. 42, 43; 1 Story Consti-
tution (5th ed.), book 3, ch. 6; Edwards v. Pope, 
3 Scam. (Ill.) 465; Bouvier's Law Dictionary." 
International U. of Op. Eng., L. 286 v. Sand 
Point c. Cl., 519 P.2d 985, 989, 990 (\'lash. 1974) 
(Emphasis added) . 
This 1974 Washington decision thereafter took great pains 
Cl. ted by appellar'. to distinguish the 1972 Krystad v. Lau case 
Specifically, they rejected the argument now urged upon 
this Court by plaintiff-appellants that the preamble W 
-4-
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thut state's "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" created subs tan-
tive rights of collective bargaining in public sector 
employees. In doing so, that court made it clear that the 
preamble created no substantive rights and stated of its 
earlier decision: 
"It was not our intent in that case to lay 
down a new rule respecting the import of policy 
statements contained in legislation." Id. at 
p. 990. 
A further discussion of this 1974 Washington decision, 
which virtually overruled the Krystad case, will be discussed 
in subpoint I B, infra. 
However, it is respectfully submitted that the lower 
court was entirely correct in its holding that plaintiff-
appellants' reliance on a preamble to create substantive 
collective bargaining rights in public employee unions was 
ill-founded. As such, all of their allegations failed to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted; this Court 
should also so rule. 
B. 
WITHOUT SPECIFIC LEGISLATION, PUBLIC SECTOR 
EMPLOYEES HAVE NO RIGHT TO COLLECTIVELY BARGAIN 
WITH THEIR GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYER. 
Other states considering the question raised by plaintiff-
appellants have uniformly held that, without specific 
legislation granting rights to collective bargaining, public 
employees have no such right. Specifically, the laws 
virtually identical to Utah's "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" 
have heen uniformly construed not to apply to public sector 
-5-
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employees. A recent illustrative case reJocting th e theory 
propounded by plain tiff-appellants and summarizing the laii 
in this area is Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of 
Wyoming, 531 P.2d 884 (Wyo. 1975). Tliis case correctly 
summarized the law as follows: 
"The section upon which reliance is made is 
a policy statement and a part of what is sometimes 
described as a 'little Norris LaGuardia Act.' 
Although not directly in point, it is hiqhly 
persuasive that numerous cases have held the 
prohibition aaainst injunctive relief therein 
granted not to be applicable when applied to 
public employees. Anderson Federation of Teachers, 
Local 519 v. School City of Anderson, 
(citations omitted) not only cites this as being 
the overwhelming weight of authority but contains 
numerous·citations and reiterated this view on 
rehearing (citations omitted). 
"It has been held generally that statutes 
governing labor relations between employers and 
employees are construed only to.apply to private 
industry (citations omitted) and had the legisla-
tive intent been that municipalities be forced 
to engage in collective bargaining that the legis-
lature woul<l have been explicit in its language, 
(citations omitted) (Authority cited) is deemed 
completely sufficient authority to our view that 
there is a dual basis for holding that the statute 
upon which the appellants relied is inapplicable 
by reiterating what is termed as an old and well-
known rule '.that statutes which in general terms 
divest pre-existing rights express words to that 
effect.' And further, after a general discussion 
of the purposes of the 'Norris-LaGuardia Act,' 
concludes: 'These considerations, on their face, 
obviously do not apply to the Government as an 
employer or to relations between the Government 
and its employees.'" (Citations omitted). . 
Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of Wyoming, 
id. at p. 8 8 8 • 
The Utah Statute relied on by plain tiff-appellants 
. . b e discussed, in this action, like the Wyoming provision a ov 
. . . t. act which forms a policy preamble to the anti-inJunc ion 
follows. 
. h noliC]' As summarized in the Wyoming case, sue ~ 
-6-
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stat.crn0nts have been un: forfTlly held not to apply to the 
;:>ubl ic sec tor. 
That judicial construction is supported by the obvious 
intent of the Legislature through its draftsmanship. Even 
a cursory readinq of Chapter 19 of Title 34 reveals that it 
deals with defining court powers and remedies available in 
the event of a private sector labor dispute. For example 
see §34-19-2: "Injunctive Relief Prohibited in Certain Cases;" 
§34-19-4: Injunctive Relief Reasons for Prohibiting;" 
§34-19-5: "Injunctive Relief When Available;" and 
§34-19-3: "Limiting Civil Liability of Union Officers." None 
of the substantive sections of that Chapter remotely deals 
with collective bargaining, let along collective bargaining 
for public employees. 
It is, further, of interest that even these anti-
injunction sections are uniformly held inapplicable to public 
sector employment. See analysis of cases so holding in 
Union Organization and Activities of Public Employees, 31 
ALR 2d 1142. 
It is also significant to note that Chapter 20 of Title 
34 deals expressly with the subject of collective bargaining. 
However, when the Legislature discussed the subject it stated: 
"'Employer' . . shall not include 
any state or political subdivision thereof. 
" 34-20-2(2) Utah Code Ann., 1953 (Replace-
ment Vol. 4 B) (Emphasis added). 
Thus, it is clear that the Legislature had no intent to 
bring st;:,te or city governments into a compulsory collective 
b,-,J -r~iinj 11-1 ,-,,I ation,;hir with public employee unions. 
-7-
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Obviously the plaintiff-appellants did not cite ChJpter 
20 in their complaint because of the cleur expression of 
legislative intent. Rather, they attempted to create a 
substantive right out of a preamble to a chapter which was 
devoted to defining court powers and remedies for a labor 
dispute in the private sector. Plaintiff-appellants' 
shoe string theory is clearly contrary to the legislative 
intent and action. 
The conclusion that the Legislature never intended and, 
in fact, never did create collective bargaining rights 
for public sector employees, in the section cited by the 
plaintiff-appellants, is further buttressed by other statutes 
narrowly drafted by the Legislature, after Chapter 19 of 
Title 34 was adopted in 1969. See, Firefighter Negotiation 
Act, §34-20a-l, Utah Code Ann., 1953 adopted in 1975, but 
subsequently held unconstitutional in Salt Lake City, et al., 
v. International Association of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 
(Utah 1977); and Public Transit District Act, §11-20-31, 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, adopted 1969, 1st Special Session. 
These later acts are specific and narrowly addressed 
to groups of public employees for collective bargaining. 
One must ask why, if rights of collective bargaining for 
public employees were intended to be granted under the 
Utah "Little Norr is-LaGuardia Act," were these subsequent 
acts necessary? Also, one must ask why such legislative 
. so 
intent and action as plaintiff-appellants now urge is 
-8-
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cleverly obscrued in a preamble to a chapter intended to 
define the court's role in pri?ate sector labor disputes? 
The answer seems clear that there was no such intent or 
action. 
Interestingly, every state court, which has been urged 
to adopt the reasoning pressed by plaintiff-appellants, has 
likewise uniformly rejected the invitation. The case most 
illuminative of this point is the State of Washington's 
decision which distinguished the Krystad case cited by 
plaintiff-appellants. It expressly held that the preamble 
to the so-called "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" could not and 
was not to be construed to grant employees the right of 
compulsory collective bargaining. 
This 1974 decision distinguished the Krystad case as 
a case relating to "yellow-dog" contracts, which interfered 
with the right of employees to form or join a labor organiza-
tion. The court held as follows: 
"Reading RCW 49.32 [Preamble to Little Norris-
LaGuardia Act] in its entirety, we are convinced 
that its purpose was to facilitate the achieve-
ment by employees of an effective bargaining 
position and that it was not its purpose to pro-
vide for compulsory collective bargaining. 
"Where the legislature has seen fit to impose 
upon employers as affirmative duty to bargain 
with their employees, it has done so by express 
statutory provislon." International Union of 
Operating Engineers Local 286 v. Sand Point 
Country Club, 519 P.2d 985, 988 (Nash. 1974). 
(Emphasis added}. 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Court thereafter correctly noted some of the problems 
which would inherently occur from the judiciu.l legislation 
plaintiff-appellants would now urge upon the Court. 
observed: 
It 
"In urging the court not to read a new provi-
sion into the policy statement in RCW 49.32.020 
[the preamble to the Washington Norris-LaGuardia 
Act], the respondents have drawn to its attention 
the inunense complexity of problems of labor-
management relations and the inadequacy of court 
structure and facilities to administer the law 
in this field without statutory guidelines or 
regulatory agencies. Professor Cornelius J. 
Peck also notes the hazards attendant upon 
judicial legislation in this area (note 2, supra). 
If the statute was open to the construction 
contended for by the appellants, these considera-
tions might well be significant in persuading the 
court that such a meaning was not intended. We 
need not weigh them, however, since we find 
that neither expressly nor impliedly has the 
legislature introduced into this statute a 
provision imposing upon employers a duty to bargain 
with 1-abor representatives." Id. at p. 988-989; 
See also Note 3 at p. 988. (Emphasis added). 
If the state elects to require collective bargaining 
between public sector employees and their governmental 
employer, there are myriad problems which will require 
considerable legislative study. Some of these problems 
include: (a) How to resolve negotiation impasse, (b) What 
issues may be the subject of bargaining and which are 
management or governmental rights; that is, which subjects 
are to be reserved as legislative in nature and, hence, 
not bargainable, (c) May strikes be permitted by public 
employees and if so, by what groups and under what condi-
tions, (d) How will employee unit determinations be made, 
certified, 
how will that unit determination be authorized and 
I 
-10-
i ,...... 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
r 
--
how many units may be certified, etc. 
such complex issues which interface with the right of 
the electorate to control their government and with govern-
ment's duty to deliver uninterrupted essential and often 
life supporting services, make the issues infinitely more 
complex than private labor disputes. 
These political-legal policy decisions must be hammered 
out in the legislative process. As other courts have uni-
formly held, these issues cannot and should not be resolved 
by the judicial legislation urged by plaintiff-appellants. 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should reject 
the plaintiff-appellants' prayer for judicial legislation 
and affirm the Lower Court in dismissing its complaint. 
POINT II 
POWER TO SET THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOY-
MENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF CITY EMPLOYEES 
IS A LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION. ABSENT A SPECIFIC 
LEGISLATIVE CHANGE, ESTABLISHING THE SALARY 
AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF CITY EMPLOYEES IS A 
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION VESTED SOLELY AND EXCLU-
SIVELY IN THE BOARD OF SALT LAKE CITY COMJ.~IS­
SIONERS. 
Utah law is clear that cities have been specifically 
granted the power to: 
(R)egulate and prescribe the powers, 
duties and compensation of all officers of the 
city, except as otherwise provided by law." 
10-6-29 Utah Code Ann. 1953 (emphasis added); 
s~e also Salt Lake City, et al., v. Interna-
tional Association of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 
7 8 6 (Utah 19 77 ) . 
Further, police officers are defined in the Civil Service 
Act dnd their acti~ities and rights monitored by the Civil 
-11-
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Service Commission. See Section 10-10-9, et seq., Utah 
Code Ann., 1953. No attack is made on the Civil Service 
Commission and no appeal or relief has been suught con-
cerning this matter by the Civil Service Commission. 
Thus, the facts alleged in plaintiff-appellants' 
complaint concerned acts, exclusively within the legisla-
tive and executive authority of the Board of Salt Lake 
City Commissioners. The complaint patently fails to state 
a legal basis or claim upon which relief may be granted. 
POINT III 
THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS' 
COMPLAINT IS MOOT AND THEY SEEK MERELY AN 
ADVISORY OPINION. 
The thrust of plaintiffs' complaint is that: (a) The 
City gave to its City employees a 5 % wage salary raise, but 
permitted employees to refuse to accept that increase upon 
1 
certain conditions precedent, among which was that the execu· 
tion of the waiver form would have to be witnessed by a 
member of the City Auditor's staff; (b) The Comrnissiondirect0 
that no union solicitation or business should be conducted 
on public time; and (c) The City Commission received certain 
proposals from the plaintiff-appellants c01;icerning salaries 
for the City's 1976 fiscal year and that the City did not 
adopt, in full, the union's recommendations; rather, it 
exercised its legislative authority and set the salaries 
for all City employees by passing an ordinance. 
. . ff-
Interestingly, there is no allegation in plainti 
app 'llants' complaint that any one of the City employees 
-12-
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rntcrestinqlv, th2re is no alleqation in plaintiff-
appel lants' complaint that any one of the City employees 
that received a salary increase did not willingly accept 
or spend the money. Further, there is no allegation that 
any employee, who received a salary increase, attempted to 
return it to the City or that a tender was refused. Also, 
there is no allegation (as in truth there could not be) 
that the union was the certified exclusive bargaining agent 
for the police. 
Rather, the complaint anemically asserts that the City 
action violated duties of collective bargaining imposed 
by the preamble to Utah's "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act." 
Certainly, its prayer for injunctive and declaratory 
relief (concerning a salary increase received and presumably 
spent by City employees) is now just seeking an advisory 
opinion. No relief is prayed seeking the City to receive 
the return of that money and no allegation is made that the 
City would refuse to accept such a donation. The whole 
issue concerning 1976 salaries has long passed into history 
and is legally moot. 
Likewise, the allegation of a legislatively mandated 
duty to bargain collectively in good faith for the year 1976 
is long since moot, quite aside from the fact that no such 
right or duty exists in law, for reasons above discussed. 
This Court can take judicial knowledge that the 1976 fiscal 
Year of Scilt Lake City, under state law, terminated June 30, 
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197 6, and that new salaries had been approvcc\ oml adopted f 
for the July 1, 1976 through June 30, 1977 City fiscal y 
ear. 
See, "Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act," 10-10-23 et seq., 
Utah Code Ann., 1953. Obviously, no issue remains to~ 
resolved by the Court concerning those salary questions as 
plead in plaintiff-appellants' complaint. 
Thus, the only real issue presented by plaintiff-appelk 
complaint, is their assertion that Salt Lake City and, by 
implication, all of Utah's governmental employees have the 
right in the future to bargain collectively in good faith, 
with their public employers. That legal assertion is unsounc 
as a matter of law as heretofore discussed in some detail. 
However, by virtue of mootness regarding past events, the 
Lower Court's decision dismissing plaintiff-appellants' com-
plaint should also be affirmed by this Court. 
POINT IV 
THE CASE LAW CITED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS IS 
NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Plaintiff-appellants cite Education of Scottsdale v. 
Scottsdale Education Association at page 8 of their br~f 
for a point not divined by this writer. Significantly, that 
case has no language quoted and, insofar as the writer can 
determine, it has no relationship whatsoever with the 
facts pending before the Court. th 
fird The case concerns e · 
ciation; 
amendment protected right of free speech and of asso 
reading could it however, under no strained construction or 
be read as imposing the duties on a public employer W 
bargain collectively with its employees. 
-14-
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roocl 1·;01·j;ers cited c1t page 7 of plaintiff-appellants' brief 
-------
holclS exactly opposite to the position for which it is 
citccl. That case held that the First Amendment right of 
free speech protected employees in their right to form an 
informational picket, under some circumstances. In addition, 
the case specifically held that the public employees had no 
right to bargain collectively with their government employer 
(as that term is used in private enterprise) without a 
specific state law authorizing and directing that procedure. 
The case held that the School's Board of Regents could, 
if they desired, meet with employees; however, they must 
retain the final power of decision. The court observed: 
"The power to hire employees, fix their 
salaries and wages, direct expenditure of money 
and to perform all other acts necessary and proper 
for the execution of the powers and duties 
conferred upon the Regents carries with it the 
power and authority to confer and consult with 
representatives of the employees in order to make 
its judgment as to wages and working conditions. 
We hold the Regents have authority to engage 
in collective bargaining in this context." 
State Board of Regents v. United Packing House, etc., 
175 N.W.2d llO, ll2 (Iowa 1970). 
". . . Such action does not. involve an improper 
delegation of legislative powers to private persons 
as there is no compulsion to sign an agreement 
and the final decision remains in the Board of 
Regents." State Board of Regents v. United Pack-
ing House, etc., Id. at p. 113 (Emphasis added). 
The Court further summarized: 
"On the other hand, if the legislature desires 
t? give public employees the adv~ntages of collec-
tive bargaining in the full sense as it is used 
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in private industry, it should do so by snecific 
legislation to thilt effect. \'/e cannotl!;~;-i--­
authority under these general powers to a~r~e 
to exclusive representation, depriving other 
employees of the right to be represented by a 
group of their choosing or of an individual to 
represent himself. (Ci tat ions omitted) ... 
The power to fix the terms and conditions of 
public employment is a legislative function which 
with proper guidelines from the leqislature, can ' 
be delegated to its administrative agencies. 
"'An endeavor by the courts to define some 
limited field for the contract system would be 
an attempt at judicial legislation.'" State 
Board of Regents v. United Packing House:-etc., 
Id. at pp. 113, 114 (Citations omitted and empha-
sis added) . 
The Iowa Court then succinctly held as follows: 
"We have heretofore held that the Board of 
Regents has no authority to enter into collective 
bargaining or collective bargaining agreements 
in the industrial context. We have also held 
the Board of Regents may voluntarily meet and 
consult with representatives of groups of employees 
to discuss wages, working conditions and griev-
ances. The decision whether to do so or not 
remains that of the Board of Regents. There-
fore, any picketing to coerce the Board of 
Regents to bargain collectively against its 
better judgment would either be illegal, against 
public pcilicy or both." Id. at p. 117, 118, 
citing a long list of cases which demonstrate 
universal recognition of the same principle. 
It is incredulous to the writer that these cases are 
cited as authority for the proposition that public sector 
employees are entitled to bargain collect.lvely, without 
the specific grant of power by the Legislature. The cases 
do not so hold and, in fact, the Iowa decision holds 
directly to the contrary. 
in 
l. s not in point; 1 Similarly, the case of Krystad v. Lau , 
of colJecti 
fact, this case did not even involve the issue 
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bargaining, aside from the entirely separate issue of 
collective bargaining for public sector employees. The 
Krystad case involved a private sector employer who fired 
an employee for seeking to form a labor organization. 
This case was subsequently distinguished by the 
Washington Supreme Court on the issue of collective bargain-
ing. As previously discussed in Point·I B, supra at p. 9 
the Washington Court clearly held that the preamble to the 
"Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" did not require collective 
bargaining, and further, the court distinguished the case 
in such a fashion as to virtually overrule it. However, 
with respect to the issue of whether the preamble to the 
"Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" created a substantive right 
of collectively bargaining, the court stated: 
"Courts in other jurisdictions which have 
been. asked to find in statutes of this kind 
an affirmative duty to engage in collective 
bargaining have consistently refused to do 
so ... (Numerous citations omitted). The 
appellants have cited no case in which a court 
has found in such a statute the meaning for which 
they contend. 
"There being no affirmative duty on the part 
of respondents to engage in collective bargaining, 
the trial court properly dismissed the action." 
Internationa~ U. of Op. Eng., L. 286 ·v. Sand 
Point C. Cl., 519 P.2d 985, 990 (Wash. 1974) 
(Emphasis added) . 
In short, the plaintiff-appellants have cited absolutely 
no authority for ~heir allegation that the preamble to 
Utah's "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" created substantive 
rights in public employees, ''hich compel governmental 
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entities to barqain collectively with public labor 0 rqan-
izations. On the contrary, every case and every authori~ 
found by the writer holds exactly opposite to that position, 
Therefore, the Lower Court should be affirmed in its decG 
sion dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
The manner in which public authorities must determine 
the wages, hours and working conditions of public employers 
is governed entirely by Constitution, State law and Civil 
Service rules and regulations. These laws define and pro-
scribe the authority of a public employer and have specifi-
cally granted to the Board of Salt Lake City Commissioners 
the power to set salaries and other terms and conditions 
of employment. 
General policy statements, such as those found in a~~ 
injunction acts, were not intended and did not alter the 
powers and responsibility of elected officials. The complex 
political-leg isl a ti ve problems of public sector collective 
bargaining can only be appropriately resolved in the halls 
of the legislative assembly, if a realignment of the tradi· 
tional and legal relationships between the government and 
its employees is desired. 
Respectfully submitted, 
:. ROGER F. CUTLER dent 
Attorney for Defendant-Respon 
101 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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